Dogfight
ends with Corrigan in pilot's seat - 11th September
2003
(Credit: The Age
- f2)
The restructuring of the Virgin
Blue shareholders' agreement underscores what
an extraordinary entrepreneur Richard Branson
is - and what clever and hard-nosed deal makers
Chris Corrigan and Peter Scanlon are.
In
less than three years Branson has turned his original
$11 millionof seed capital into $500 million of
cash and a half share in a $1.4
billion-plus airline.
Although
he was fortunate that Ansett fell over so quickly
and created an easy opportunity for Virgin Blue
to grow profitably and rapidly to a 30 per cent
market share, the original recognition of the
opportunity and its disciplined execution by the
Virgin Blue team represent a remarkable venture
capital success story.
Corrigan
and Scanlon were not involved during the period
of highest risks and returns, but their effort
in achieving a paper profit of more than $200
million on an 18-month investment would be impressive
even if they had not out-manoeuvred Branson in
the process.
When
Patrick Corporation bought into Virgin Blue early
last year its value and prospects were uncertain.
At the time Virgin Blue was considering acquiring
some of Ansett's assets and wanted the capital
and financial flexibility to do so, and to fund
its expansion into the vacuum left by Ansett.
Branson's
Virgin Atlantic was under pressure following the
September 11 terrorist attacks, and his British
railway business was in trouble. Patrick's cash
would have been very appealing at the time.
Branson
struck what seemed to be a good deal. Patrick
paid $260 million for a half share in Virgin Blue
and agreed to pay $30 million more for every $100
million increase in the airline's value above
$600
million.
That
protected Branson in the event that Virgin Blue
was wildly successful, and it wasn't unpalatable
for Patrick because it would share in any escalation
in value (although its exposure to value-added
would be only 20 per cent).
When
Virgin Blue is floated, only Branson's Virgin
Group will experience dilution. Patrick will retain
at least 45 per cent.
Branson
is a notoriously tough dealer and has a reputation
as a difficult partner. Corrigan, Scanlon and
their legal advisers, Arnold Bloch Leibler, however,
seem to have neatly used the value escalation
to distract him from the implications of the finer
detail of the agreement.
Patrick
agreed that in any future float it would sell
5 per cent of Virgin Blue but was under no obligation
to sell more. Effectively the clause guaranteed
that at some future point, unless Branson was
prepared to live within and fund the joint venture
structure in perpetuity, Patrick would gain an
option on controlling the business.
For
Branson to maintain a matching shareholding with
Patrick, any float was limited to a maximum of
10 per cent of Virgin Blue's capital. Anything
more than that would have to come out of his shareholding,
leaving Patrick as the dominant shareholder.
A
float of only 10 per cent of Virgin Blue wouldn't
be worth pursuing.
Branson
and Patrick clashed over the interpretation of
the agreement. Branson gave Patrick notice of
an intention to float the airline, with each partner
selling 5 per cent of the capital into the float
and Virgin Blue issuing shares representing another
20 per cent.
That would have evenly diluted both shareholders
below 45 per cent and would have maximised the
valuation of Virgin Blue, therefore Patrick's
liability, under the escalation formula.
In
the end the dispute was resolved in Patrick's
favour. An independent arbitrator ruled that Patrick
was entitled to maintain 45 per cent.Corrigan
had gained a veto over any raising unless Branson
was
prepared to sell down his stake or be diluted,
and cede control in the process. He also gained
some leverage he could use to limit Patrick's
exposure under the escalation agreement.
Yesterday
Patrick and Virgin Group restructured the shareholders'
agreement. The escalation agreement is finished,
with Patrick paying $240 million as settlement.
Patrick
has limited its liabilities in relation to Virgin
Blue's potential value at what seems to be a reasonable
level, rather than the potentially far more expensive
outcome had Branson been able to
pursue his intentions.
Patrick
has also agreed to the issuing of $400 million
of new capital in any public listing of Virgin
Blue, the timing of which is in Branson's control.
However, Patrick will no longer be required to
sell any of its shares and will have the right
to subscribe for enough new shares to ensure that
its stake is not less than 45 per cent of the
expanded capital.
When
Virgin Blue is floated, only Branson's Virgin
Group will experience dilution. Patrick will retain
at least 45 per cent; Virgin Group will probably
hold between 35 and 40 per cent (less if it sells
any of its shares into the float) and Corrigan
will have cemented his position as the dominant
shareholder and voice in the airline's affairs.
Branson's
attempt to maintain an equal shareholding signals
that he really wanted to maximise his influence
and his holding in a listed Virgin Blue.
The
airline's future growth is unlikely to be as spectacular
as it has been since inception. The easy incursions
into the domestic market have been made, and this
week's regulatory rejection of the proposed Qantas
and Air New Zealand alliance has ensured that
any expansion into the trans-Tasman and NZ domestic
markets will be fiercely contested.
Branson
and Corrigan clearly believe that there is considerable
momentum and upside left in Virgin Blue. However,
it is Corrigan who has manoeuvred himself into
the pilot's seat for the next leg of Virgin Blue's
amazing journey.
Links:
Official
websites
Virgin
Virgin
Blue
Virgin
Atlantic
Patrick
Corporation
Articles
The
Virgin Files
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